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Abstract 
Corporate entities enjoy legal subjectivity in a variety of forms, but they are not 
human beings. Hence, their legal capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own 
is not universal. This Article lays out a stylized model that explores, from a normative 
point of view, one of the limits that ought to be set on corporate capacity to act "as if" 
they had a human nature − the capacity to commit crime. Accepted wisdom states that 
corporate criminal liability is justified as a measure to deter criminal behavior. Our 
analysis supports this intuition in one subset of cases, but also reveals that deterrence 
might in fact be undermined in another subset of cases, especially in an environment 
saturated with plea bargains involving serious violations of the law.  
The Framework 
The separate legal person of corporate entities is a prevalent staple of 
developed legal systems and is commonly interpreted as a device to 
allocate risk among corporate constituencies, and especially between 
owners and creditors.1 It is equally clear, however, that corporations are 
distinct from natural persons and hence their legal subjectivity, i.e. their 
capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own, is limited. For 
example, corporations cannot be elected to public office. These limits are 
a perennial subject of discussion which permeates numerous fields of 
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1 This assertion is based on the premise that as long as a corporation is solvent the "veil" separating the 
corporation from  its owners is allowed to remain intact − i.e., need not be "pierced." and hence there is 
less meaning to the separateness of corporate rights and obligations. Once the corporation becomes 
insolvent, however, the veil protects owners from the reach of the corporate creditors; hence the 
existence of a veil is a mode of allocating the risk of insolvency to the creditors − rather than to the 
owners of the firm. The efficiency reasons behind opting for such an allocation of risk, especially in the 
case of publicly held firms, is articulated, inter alia, in Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). 
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law.2 This Article explores one of these borderline cases − the issue of 
corporate crime.  
It was famously stated that corporations do not have a "body to be 
kicked" or a "soul to be saved."3 If this is true, can a soulless, bodiless 
entity commit a crime? As a matter of positive law, jurisdictions vary on 
this question. Whereas in common law systems corporations are frequent 
defendants in criminal proceedings,4 in some important civil law 
jurisdictions (Germany for example) the accepted wisdom is that  
companies are "incapable" of forming criminal intent (mens rea) and thus 
are immune to criminal charges.5,6 Although this purist view has waned 
in a number of European jurisdictions in recent years, for convenience we 
refer to it as the "European approach," in contrast to the traditional 
common law approach that recognizes corporate criminal liability.  
In what sense does the European approach doubt the capacity of 
corporations to engage in criminal behavior? Clearly, corporations are no 
less "capable" of forming mens rea than they are competent to form 
contractual resolve or delictual intent, and yet they are universally 
recognized as bearers of contractual or delictual rights and obligations. In 
fact, companies cannot do things to a greater extent than they can intend 
to do them; hence, even corporate actus reus, which is routinely worked 
into European criminal jurisprudence, let alone contractual or tortious 
liability, raises exactly the same conceptual "capacity" difficulties as the 
psychological intention to commit a felony. Since as a matter of empirical 
                                                            
2 Discussions about the nature and scope of the so-called "artificial" legal person have a long and 
respectable pedigree. For a general survey, see Martin Wolff, The Nature of Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. 
REV. 494 (1938). 
3 To the best of our knowledge, Lord Edward Thurlow, who served for a number of years as Lord 
Chancellor of England in the 18th Century, was the first to use a similar metaphor.  
4 In actuality, crimes are committed by natural persons. Since traditional English law was loath to 
ascribe to anyone, including a corporation, vicarious criminal liability for a crime committed by 
someone else, it developed the so-called "organic theory" which holds that certain key officers are not 
mere agents of the corporate entity, but are actually its "organs." Consequently, the corporation's 
liability for their crimes is "direct", or "personal," rather than vicarious. For a line of case embracing 
this view and their analysis, see L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 206 et seq. 
(4th ed., 1979). 
5 An excellent comprehensive summary of the current state of corporate criminal liability in a variety 
of important European jurisdictions was prepared by the Clifford Chance Law Firm, available at 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDFs/Corporate_Liability_in_Europe.pdf 
(2012). 
6  The notion that corporate entities are not capable of committing crime is probably fed by the 
narrative one imagines when imagining criminals, a narrative which does not sit well with non-human 
offenders. On the psychology of thinking about criminals in this context, see Tom Tyler and Avital 
Mentovich, Punishing Collective Entities, 19 J. L. & POL'Y 203 (2015). 
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observation corporations cannot either do or intend to do anything, the 
question must be removed from the realm of is and placed in the realm of 
ought; namely should corporations, as a normative matter, be treated as if 
they could form criminal intent and be charged with crimes − in spite of 
the fact that they are obviously nothing but a figment of the human 
imagination. 
Clearly, corporate criminal liability entails some externalities that 
mutilate against the concept. The corporate entity does not mind the 
severity of the sanction, simply because it does not possess the potential 
to suffer. Rather, those who suffer are often innocent agents, like 
stockholders and other stakeholders whose personal fortunes are tapped 
to foot the bill. But externalities of this nature are perennial both in the 
non-corporate world and in corporate law. Outside of corporate law, if a 
defendant is found guilty and sanctioned, a multitude of innocents,  such 
as family members, creditors or business associates could be 
unintentionally, but unavoidably, penalized. Within corporate law, 
stakeholders pay the consequences of corporate contract breaches, tort 
malfeasance, or other violations of the law at the same level as when a 
company pays a criminal fine. The added element of criminal sanctions, 
the stigma resulting from conviction, does not normally attach to innocent 
corporate agents, because stigma is a moral response to turpitude, and 
innocent stakeholders are often clean as a whistle. In an imperfect world, 
these necessary externalities are treated as collateral damage and 
dismissed with a nod. 
Even if we put aside negative spillovers affecting innocent agents, we still 
have to answer the normative question: Why impose criminal 
responsibility on the corporate form? Accepted wisdom is straightforward 
in this respect: it is speculated that corporate criminal liability enhances 
the goal of deterrence.7 The argument goes like this: Corporate 
incumbents, such as corporate directors and officers, personally loath 
their corporation being convicted in criminal proceedings. Some are 
                                                            
7   Obviously, deterrence is not criminal law's only objective. For instance, the philosophy of retribution 
or an interest in preventing perpetrators from committing future violations may motivate criminal law. 
But such objectives are hardly applicable to corporate crime, which seems to be mainly motivated by 
the goal of deterrence. For various aspects of this hypothesis see, e.g., Henry Edgerton, Corporate 
Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 833 (1927); Bruce Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal 
Liability Really Necessary?, 29 SW L. J. 908, 919 et seq. (1975); CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1993). 
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motivated by pure respect for the law;  others, even those who are not 
themselves without unblemished behavior, recognize that their personal 
fortunes depend, to greater or lesser extent, on corporate appearance of 
lawfulness and trustworthiness. A director or officer whose firm was 
publicly exposed for criminal activity under her watch may be severely 
disciplined by the forces of the market for managerial talent8, and 
arguably, to a lesser extent, by those of the capital market9 and the market 
for corporate control10. To avoid being in that spot, directors and officers 
(except the perpetrator of the crime himself) have a strong incentive to 
monitor each other's potentially criminal behavior and to otherwise guard 
not only against corruption per se, but rather against the resulting 
personal embarrassment. With an army of spies, crime gets to become 
more costly, and at an equilibrium, more scarce11.  
To make the story even more convincing, a plethora of laws have been 
passed in many jurisdictions, that impute corporate criminal 
responsibility on senior directors and officers as well, unless they can 
exculpate themselves  by proving that the crime was committed without 
their knowledge and that they were not negligent in preventing its 
occurrence.12 In Israel, this practice is particularly prevalent, as special 
statutes impute corporate crimes on directors and officers in a large 
gamut of "relevant" crimes, i.e. those that are typically committed by 
entities. The total number of such statutes in Israel is about 150. They 
                                                            
8This is either because she could be sued by the corporation for breach of a fiduciary obligation, or 
because the demand for her services is anticipated to decline. 
9  Firms with a criminal record might find it costlier to raise funds and hence to compete against other 
firms with a lower cost of capital. 
10  Severe criminal sanctions could depress the value of a corporation's stock and make it easy prey for 
hostile takeover bids, in which incumbent officers would lose their grip on their position of 
stewardship. 
11  See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. 
STUD. 833 (1994). In this thoughtful piece, Professor Arlen both documents this common contention 
and criticizes it. 
12  See, e.g., the Statute Law Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act 2015 (NO 26 OF 2015) (Austl.), 
which was passed in Victoria, Australia which amended a variety of laws to include a clause that 
imputes corporate criminal liability to corporate officers, unless they can prove their diligence in 
preventing the crime. In the United States, an evolving doctrine imputes personal liability on senior 
officers under certain statutes, such as the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, P.L.111-353; 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.; Clean Air Act, 2 U.S.C. ; and the Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.  See Brenda Hustis & John Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate 
Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 169 (1994); Cinthia Finn, The 
Responsible Corporate Officer, Criminal Liability and Mens Rea: Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 
AM. U. L. REV. 543 (1996). 
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regulate a wide variety of issues:  tax evasions of all kinds,13 antitrust 
violations,14 health and environmental infractions,15 labor and 
employment law violations16 and a rich repertoire of additional crimes 
that are likely to be committed by corporations.17 Imputing corporate 
liability to human actors also influences the secondary legislation domain, 
i.e., government regulations18 and municipal ordinances.19 This practice 
in itself has some unsavory aspects because it imposes vicarious criminal 
liability on these senior officers, for crimes of mens rea, in spite of the 
fact that their state of mind was mere negligence; the silver lining is that 
the fear of personal criminal liability augments the innocent agents' 
incentive to monitor potential perpetrators to further reduce the incidence 
of crime. Let us assume arguendo that if that were the end of the story we 
would have been content to interpret this "massacre of the innocents" as if 
it were just another necessary form of collateral damage. 
Unfortunately, there is another angle to this story, which has to do with 
the political economy of prosecutors and courts, and the game they play 
with corporate incumbents. Prosecutors are commonly rewarded, through 
                                                            
13 See, e.g., Income Tax Ordinance, 5721-1961, § 224A, as amended (Isr.); Value Added Tax Law, 
5736-1975, § 119 (Isr.); Real Estate Tax Law, 5723-1963, § 99 (Isr.); Property and Compensation Fund 
Tax Law, 5721-1961, § 58 (Isr.);Section 224A of the Income Tax Ordinance; Section 119 of the Value 
Added Tax Law, 1975; Section 99 of the Real Estate Tax Law, 2011; Section 58 of the Property and 
Compensation Fund Tax Law, 1961 and the Profits from Natural Resources Tax Law, 5771-2011, § 28 
(Isr.).Section 28 of the Profits from Natural Resources Tax Law, 2011.  
14  Limitation of Trade Law, 5748-1988, § 48 (Isr.). Section 48 of the Limitation of Trade Law, 1998. 
15 In  this  endless  list  some prominent examples  are Section 72 of  the Clean Air  Law, 2011;  Section 
18(b) of the Prevention of Oil Pollution of the Sea  Ordinance, 1980; Section 11C of the Prevention of 
Environmental  Hazards  Law,  1961;  Section  16  of  the  Removal  and  Recycling  of  Tires  Law,  2007; 




16   For  example,  Section  38  (b)  of  the  Youth  Employment  Law,  1953;  Section  16  of  the  Equal 
Opportunity in the Workplace Law, 1988; Section 220 of the Maritime (Sailors) Law, 1973; Section 22 





of  the  Securities  Law,  1968;  Section 111A  (b)  of  the Mines Ordinance;  Section 16 of  the Holocaust 
Victims Claims Law, 1957; Section 143 of the Aviation Law, 2011; Section 30 of the Struggle Against 
the  Iranian  Nuclear  Project  Law,  2012;  Section  63  of  the  Copyright  Law,  2007;  Section  55  of  the 
Electricity Law, 1996 and Section 46 of the Regulated Housing Law, 2012. 
18 See, e.g., Protection of Animals (Raising of Pigs) Regulation, 5775-2015, §30 (Isr.) Regulation 30 of 
the Protection of Animals (Raising of Pigs) Regulation, 2016 or Ports (Loading Regulation 63 of the 
Ports (Loading and Unloading of Oils) Regulation, 1975. 
19 For example, the Section 33 of the Jerusalem Municipality (Public Signs) By-Laws or Section 101 
(b) of the Kfar-Sava Municipality (Maintenance of the Environment) By-Laws, 2008.  
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promotion and otherwise, on the basis of their "success rate" in 
prosecutorial activities. Since it is hard to gauge what "success" precisely 
means, there is a prevalent practice to interpret the concept as a forensic 
effort resulting in conviction.20 Indeed, Israel's staggering conviction rate, 
about 99.5% of all criminal trials, is at least partially explained by the fact 
that even if there is a single conviction in a multi-party, multi-defendants 
criminal trial, the result is counted as a "conviction." Less attention is 
focused in reaching that rate of conviction on the number of convicted 
suspects in any given charge or on the severity of the sentence.21 
It is well-known that most criminal proceedings involve plea bargaining22 
which judges are normally happy to embrace, since the alternative is a 
lengthy and cumbersome trial that is a burden on their congested dockets 
as well as on their leisure activities. Now it works to the advantage of 
everyone (except corporations and their innocent stakeholders) to strike a 
deal, in which directors and officers plead guilty on behalf of the 
corporation, in exchange for dropping the personal charges against them. 
The officers get an easy way out of a looming conviction; the prosecutors 
                                                            
20   Roger Koppl &Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for False 
Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013) (discussing prosecutors incentives to ensure 
convictions in criminal trials, in spite of their presumed role as officers of the court whose only 
objective function should be minimizing judicial error). The authors are careful to observe that these 
incentives do not necessarily reach a cognitive conscious level, but this possibility does not reduce their 
prevalence.  See also a speech delivered by former US Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens at the 
Equal Justice Initiative held in his honor in New York on May 2, 2011, where he reached similar 
conclusions, available at  
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/Equal%20Justice%20Init%20Dinner%20(1606_00
1).pdf;  see also John Coffee, An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 
MICH. L. REV. 836 (1981); Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Prosecutors, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 231 (Alon Harel & Keith Hylton eds., 2012); Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargains Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Albert Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Stephen Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L. J. 1979 (1992). Another explanation for prosecutorial enthusiasm 
to plea-bargain has to do with consideration of budget constraints. Litigation is costly, and litigation in 
the area of white collar crime is particularly so, given the vast resources that are usually marshalled on 
the defense side. Plea bargains are cheap and generate more convictions, given bugetary constraints, 
than any type of adversary proceedings. See Jed Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-
Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. See also 
Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Control, 93 YALE L. J. 857 
(1984). Some commentators emphasize that the average length of prison sentences, rather than the rate 
of convictions, is what motivates prosecutors as a means of advancing their careers. See Richard 
Boylan, What do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 379 (2005). 
 
21  See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Inbal Galon, & Keren Weinshall-Margel, Conviction and Acquittal Rates in 
Israel, Israel Courts Research Division, 




are relieved from trying a staggering number of criminal cases, and by the 
same token, improve their conviction rates; and the judges can manage 
their dockets more easily and spend more time with their grandkids. Only 
the corporation, since it does not possess a mind of its own to reject the 
plea bargain, is convicted of crimes that it may have not  committed − to 
the detriment of its stockholders and other innocent stakeholders.  
Obviously, and in spite of this incentive-structure, some cases involving 
corporate crime do go to trial, i.e. do not end in plea bargains. Similarly, 
some prosecutors decline to be swayed by the personal lure embedded in 
plea bargains. Our purpose is not to argue that all cases are settled out of 
court, but based on some empirical evidence it is clear that when they do, 
incumbent officers are normally dropped from the indictment.23 This is 
hardly surprising, because it only clarifies that in this context, like in 
many other contexts, incentives matter. In the following lines, we 
compare the impact of corporate criminal liability, with and without plea 
bargains, on incentives to monitor corporate criminality and to deter 
crime. 
Discussion 
We formalize, in a rather stylized manner, three possible regimes: no 
corporate criminal liability ("the European approach"), corporate criminal 
liability without plea bargains, and corporate criminal liability in which 
plea bargains abound. This Article concludes that the second case, 
corporate criminal liability without plea bargains has, at least in the case 
of serious crimes, the greatest effect on deterrence and consequently on 
the reduction of crime. Since the main purpose of corporate criminal 
liability is assumed to be deterrence, and deterrence is particularly 
important in the case of serious crimes, the normative conclusion of this 
Article is that plea bargains ought to be banned, or at least closely 
regulated, in cases of severe violations of the law. The comparison 
between the two remaining cases, the European approach and corporate 
criminal liability cum plea bargains, is more nuanced. The European 
approach is clearly the least effective in terms of crime prevention. Its 
                                                            
23  A recent study conducted under the guidance of Professor Oren Gazal-Ayal, Haifa University, 
analyzed 185 criminal violations and trials (2001-2009) for water pollution. In 95.7% of the cases 
brought against corporations, senior executives were added as co-defendants. However, in the vast 
majority of cases in which a plea bargain was struck, 95% of the human actors were dropped from the 
indictment. Four percent of these cases ended in acquittal. 
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proponents claim that it has the deontological advantage of inflicting 
fewer negative externalities on innocent parties, but this claim too seems 
suspect when viewed from an ex ante perspective, because more crime 
necessarily entails more innocent crime victims.   
We model a corporation with a number of senior officers, all of whom, 
like the other players in our narrative, are assumed to be risk neutral 
expected-utility maximizers. One of these officers, whose identity is 
unknown, is a potential offender. If the crime is detected and sanctioned, 
the same sanction extends to the corporation.24 In addition, we assume 
that it also extends to all of its innocent senior officers, unless they can 
exculpate themselves by proving diligent behavior.25 One method of 
exculpation is to report the crime as soon as it comes to their attention 
and before it is independently detected by law enforcement authorities. 
The criminal sanction imposed upon conviction is C. The probability of 
detection is p. If the crime is not detected, the perpetrator derives a 
benefit of β, which is also the cost for society resulting from the 
commission of the crime26. If the crime is detected, every officer, except 
those who diligently reported the crime to law enforcement authorities, 
suffers a disutility of α (α<β<C)27 occasioned by loss of reputation and 
resulting market discipline. This loss of reputation is spared to reporting 
officers because they prevented the commission of the crime; their 
                                                            
24  This is, in essence, the meaning of the English law term "organic theory" of the corporation – i.e.,  
consequences of a crime committed by an "organ" of the corporation affect the corporate entity and not 
only  the perpetrator (see supra note 7). In practice, some statutes ordain that the sanction imposed on 
the corporation be greater than the sanction imposed on the perpetrator. For example, Section 53 of the 
Israeli Securities Law states that certain fines imposed on corporate entities are five times more severe 
than those imposed on individual perpetrators. For the purposes of this Article we need not consider 
this possibility (see Israeli Securities Law,     ) . 
25  One could demur that a more equitable result should scale down the sentence meted out to directors 
and officers, in accordance with their actual culpability. We have no evidence that this is actually the 
case. Some statutes imputing corporate criminal liability on its senior officers explicitly state that 
sanctions  against both defendants, corporations, and individuals ought to be the same. (In Israel, see, 
e.g., Section 22 of the Income Guarantee Law, 1980.) It is difficult to substantiate empirically whether 
the sanctions are identical; particularly given the prevalent practice of letting officers off the hook in 
exchange for their agreement that the corporation plead guilty. In this Article we assume identical 
sentences in the rare case a plea bargain was not struck. 
26  For example, if the crime involves embezzlement, the offender's payoff equals the loss of the crime 
victims.  
27  This expression means that the loss of reputation is less severe than the cost of the crime, and the 
latter is lesser than the punishment meted out in cases the crime was detected. One could reasonably 
argue that C is not uniform across the board. Clearly, some methods of punishment, such as 
incarceration, cannot be administered for corporate convictions. Likewise, it is possible that in spite of 
our comment in supra note 28 the punishment meted out to the perpetrator might be more severe than 
that of the innocent officers, because the perpetrator's guilt is direct, and the innocent officers' liability 
is vicarious. However, in the following analysis these distinctions are irrelevant , because if we stick to 
the assumption that α < β < C for all players, the results of the following analysis remain intact. 
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conduct proved their diligence and commitment to lawful corporate 
behavior. The payoff to the innocent officers in the case of non-detection 
is zero. We further assume that in a world without plea bargains a 
detected crime goes to trial and a clairvoyant court convicts the offender. 
Thus, risk neutral perpetrators are expected to commit the crime if- 
(1) β > p(C + α)28. 
If C is set at the socially optimal level, i.e. β/p,29 no crime should be 
committed by rational agents, because its expected benefit to the 
perpetrator is negative.30 In that ideal case, corporate criminal liability 
would be redundant, because there would be no crimes to be deterred. But 
crimes are committed nevertheless; thus. It must be conjectured that their 
commission is still prevalent because offenders are over-optimistic and 
they irrationally under-estimate the magnitude of C or p, or over-estimate 
β.31 The manner to combat this situation is to devise ways to correct the 
myopic estimation of the offenders, such that C, p and β attain, in their 
eyes, realistic proportions. This role is assigned, in the current system, to 
the innocent officers. Assume that if an innocent officer is charged with 
the crime committed by the perpetrator, the probability of exculpation 
based on exemplary behavior is q. Hence, if a crime is committed by the 
perpetrator, innocent officers face an expected cost of Cp(1-q) + αp.32 
Note that if the crime is detected and sanctioned α is suffered by the 
innocent officers even if they took diligent efforts to forestall it. Each 
innocent officer can engage in monitoring efforts at the cost of K, and she 
is incentivized to do so if K is small enough, compared to the risk that a 
perpetrator would commit a crime and inflict the resulting damage on her 
peers. The rhetoric is that these monitoring efforts scare away offenders 
                                                            
28 This inequality follows from our assumption that perpetrators are risk neutral expected utility 
maximizers: They will commit a crime only if the benefit exceeds the penalty plus the cost of loss of 
reputation times its probability that the crime be detected and penalized. For example, if the penalty is 
10 and the loss of reputation is 6 and the probability of detection and punishment is 50%, the crime is 
assumed to be in the wings if its benefit to the perpetrator exceeds 8. 
29 This is the optimal fine, because it re-internalizes to offenders all the external costs of their crimes, 
not only those that have been detected and then vindicated. 
30  It is negative because in cases of detection the perpetrator pays not only C, which fully internalizes 
the external costs of the crime, but also suffers a disutility of α. 
31  This observation is not unique to corporate crime. It holds true across the board of human 
criminality; if the expected cost of punishment exceeds its benefit to the perpetrator, rational actors 
should be sufficiently deterred from engaging in criminal activity. If crime is nevertheless rampant, the 
only explanation is that criminals err in their estimation of costs and benefits. 
32  C is imposed on the innocent officers only by the combined probabilities of detection (p) and of 
non-exculpation (1-q). In addition, in cases of detection innocent officers suffer the loss of reputation α. 
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and hence actually reduce crime. This is, roughly speaking, the rationale 
of imposing criminal liability on corporate entities and on their senior 
officers. 
Thus far, we assumed that the perpetrator actually committed the crime, 
and hence, due to the court's assumed clairvoyance, if the crime is 
detected (at the probability of p) conviction is certain. In other words, the 
probabilities of detection and that of conviction are identical. But in a 
world with plea bargains, this assumption may not necessarily hold, 
because the prosecution may err in its decision to indict and hence the 
probability of conviction by a clairvoyant court, herby denoted γ, is less 
than unity. Of course, if a plea bargain is actually struck, conviction 
follows as a matter of certainty. If the accused declines to accept the 
offer, she still retains a chance of (1-γ) to be acquitted. Since all cases are 
assumed to be concluded with plea bargains, the only defendants, 
corporate entities, are sometimes penalized without guilt, and when all 
these cases are aggregated (call their number n) corporations (and their 
innocent constituencies) suffer an unwarranted penalty of nC(1-γ).33 
Innocent constituencies foot the bill even if the crime had in fact been 
committed; this "collateral damage" is exacerbated in the case of actual 
innocence. Let us now examine if this collateral damage is justified in 
terms of deterrence. 
The suspected perpetrator is motivated to accept the bargain in the pre-
conviction stage, if- 
(2)  α < Cγ + αγ, or α(1-γ) < Cγ34.  
Since C > α and if we assume the reasonable assumption that γ > 0.5, the 
conclusion seems certain that the suspected perpetrator will accept the 
bargain − whether she is in fact guilty or not.  
We now turn our attention to the innocent officers. Risk neutral innocent 
officers will be incentivized to accept the bargain if- 
(3)  α < Cγ(1-q) + αγ, or α(1-γ) < Cγ (1-q)35.  
                                                            
33  This is the unwarranted cost of the system because n corporations pay the penalty of C in spite of the 
probability (1-γ) of their innocence. 
34 If the suspected perpetrator accepts the bargain her only penalty is the loss of reputation, α. She will 
accept the bargain if α is smaller than the expected cost of facing trial, which is the criminal penalty C 
plus the loss of reputation α, discounted by the probability of innocence (1-q). 
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Unlike the perpetrator, the set of cases in which the innocent officers 
might decline to accept the offer is conceivably non-empty; for instance, 
if q =1 the inequality will not hold and the bargain will not be struck. 
Nonetheless it is very reasonable to assume that given the smallness of 
the left-hand side of the inequality and the empirical evidence that γ is 
quite substantial (the prosecution wins the vast majority of litigated 
cases), a bargain will be struck save, again, in those exceptional cases 
where the innocent officers are quite certain that they can establish their 
innocence in open court. This conclusion is further buttressed if the 
innocent officers are risk averse and if the cost of establishing innocence 
in open court is non-trivial. Finally, we trust that the remaining two 
players, the prosecutor and the sitting judge, are set to support the bargain 
as a dominant strategy from their respective points of view.  
It now becomes common knowledge that with the exception of the 
remote possibility that innocent officers will decline to accept a bargain, 
it will indeed be struck. The question remains how does the realization of 
this fact affect the ex-ante incentives of innocent officers to monitor 
potential perpetrators.  
There are three relevant states of the world. First, a state of affairs 
mimicking the European approach, where only flesh and blood offenders 
face criminal liability ("Case 1"). Second, a state of affairs mimicking the 
common law model, where only corporations may be charged with 
crimes committed by their senior officers, augmented by some sort of 
vicarious criminal liability that is imputed to innocent officers unless they 
can prove some version of good behavior, but exclude plea bargains 
("Case 2"). Finally, Case 3 is identical to Case 2 but plea bargains 
abound. 
We start by comparing Case 1 to Case 2. In Case 1, monitoring efforts are 
expected to occur if K<αp. In Case 2, on the other hand, more monitoring 
efforts will be invested, since they are expected to materialize if K < 
                                                                                                                                                                          
35  As is with the case of the perpetrator, if the innocent officers accept the plea bargain their only cost 
is α. However, if they go to trial their expected cost is smaller than the expected cost of the perpetrator, 
because they can exculpate themselves at the probability of (1-q). 
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Cp(1-q) + αp; Clearly, then, Case 2 dominates Case 1 in terms of the 
objective of reducing crime.36 
We proceed now to compare Case 2 to Case 3. As we just observed, 
senior officers will have an incentive to monitor perpetrators in Case 2 if 
K < Cp(1-q) + αp; in Case 3,  senior officers are already aware that if a 
suspicion of a crime should be detected they will be offered a plea 
bargain, and hence their monitoring efforts will be conditioned on K < αγ. 
It follows that more monitoring efforts are expected to be undertaken in 
Case 2 if-  
(4)  Cp(1-q) + αp > αγ.  
Now suppose that the sentencing policy approximates its optimum, 
namely C = β/p. If this is the case we can substitute β for Cp in the left-
hand side of the inequality, such that the inequality can be restated as- 
(5)  β(1-q) + αp > αγ. 
We may safely assume that γ > p, because the rate of convictions is 
considerably higher than the rate of detection. It follows that although β > 
α, inequality (5) may be violated in cases of insignificant crimes when β 
is sufficiently small (say, in cases involving relatively insignificant 
environmental infractions). But in cases of severe criminality, say in 
some sophisticated antitrust violations, where β is large enough, Case 3 
emerges as inferior to Case 2 in terms of crime reduction. For instance, if 
β =10, α =5, p=0.2, γ = 0.8, and q = 0.5, more attempts to commit crime 
will be monitored and prevented in a world without plea bargains. The 
normative implications of this result are quite significant. Plea bargains 
are not struck because of their "truth value" (defined as a state of the 
world where the guilty are punished and the innocent are exonerated). 
Quite the contrary, plea bargains are never aligned with this ideal state of 
the world, because the negotiated sentence is too slight if the offenders 
are guilty and too severe in cases of innocence. Plea bargains are struck 
because they clear congested dockets and make it possible for the 
administration of criminal justice to move forward and also because they 
fit the private objective functions of the relevant players. But the resulting 
injustice is more striking when the bargain is negotiated in cases of 
                                                            




serious felonies than it is in instances of minor infractions of the law. 
Inequality (5) suggests that the time saving obtained by plea bargains 
ought to be reserved for the lesser crimes (where β is relatively small), 
but ought to be discarded, or at least closely regulated, in cases of severe 
violations of the law. Inequality (5) accomplishes two goals: it formalizes 
this result in terms of crime prevention, and it conforms to the intuition 
that the truth value of sentences ought to be particularly important in 
cases of severe criminality. 
It remains to be considered how one compares Cases 1 and 3. In this case 
it is evident the European approach is the least effective measure to 
reduce crime, since it is clear that αp < αγ.  Nor can this drawback of the 
European approach be easily justified on the grounds that it liberates 
innocent parties of the need to pay for someone else's depravity: Once the 
crime of perpetrators is discovered and penalized, they alone bear the 
consequences; but since there are bound to be more perpetrators under the 
European approach because monitoring and deterrence are less effective, 
in the ex-ante situation the consequences of the perpetrators' depravity is 
visited upon a larger number of innocent victims. 
One possible objection that is noted in the literature and needs to be 
addressed before drawing a conclusion suggests that once innocent senior 
officers are alerted to the commission of the crime they might have an 
incentive to stonewall it as a means of fending off their personal disutility 
resulting from its exposure. Clearly, if they engage in this behavior they 
forfeit their chances of exculpation, which are only reserved for players 
displaying exemplary behavior. But in a world where everything ends 
with plea bargains it could be contended that the risk of detection is 
reduced, from the senior officers' point of view, even without chances of 
exculpation, to just α, and this reduction of risk enhances their ex ante 
motivation to hide their damaging information if they become aware of 
the commission of the crime. However, this analysis does not hold 
according to the tenets of the present model. Stonewalling officers still 
face an expected cost of αp (recall that in the relevant situation q = 0 and 
α = γ), whereas early reporting of the crime exposes them to the expected 
cost of zero. Even if we relax our assumption that exposing the crime 
obliterates the loss of reputation in its entirety, it is reasonable to assume 
that it is sufficiently lower than the expected cost of a plea bargain. 
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  Conclusion 
The European approach, which rejects the notion of corporate criminal 
liability, is supposed to have some attractive features, because it penalizes 
only the human perpetrators of crime and hence avoids imposing 
punishment on innocent third parties, such as the corporate stakeholders 
or members of the managerial team. But this view, which hails the lack of 
crime spill-overs, seems to be true only in the ex-post stage, after the 
crime had already been committed. In the ex-ante stage, it is also 
important to provide incentives to reduce crime, because the reduction of 
crime in itself is the best method to mitigate externalities − the adverse 
effects suffered by the crime victims.  
The common law approach is designed to achieve exactly this purpose, to 
provide incentives to some relevant players, other than the perpetrators 
themselves, to monitor each other to minimize the occurrence of 
corporate criminality. These incentives are effective, as far as the relevant 
innocent players are involved, not only because they abhor crime per se, 
but also because they suffer loss of reputation if corporate criminality 
occurs on their watch and become known to all and sundry. Their 
incentives to monitor each other and to prevent crime is enhanced if 
corporate criminal liability is extended to their own person save in cases 
where they can establish lack of negligence in preventing the crime. This 
additional feature, of extending corporate criminal liability to human 
actors is prevalent in some jurisdictions, Israel being a prime example. 
It follows from the above that the main, perhaps the only rationale of both 
corporate criminal liability and of extending corporate liability to human 
actors is grounded on the desire to provide incentives for the reduction of 
crime. However, as is well-known, most criminal trials are concluded 
with a plea bargain. Plea bargains are necessary as a means to clear 
judicial dockets, and are favored by all relevant players because they are 
well-aligned with their personal interests. A common form of plea 
bargains features a guilty plea by the corporate entity in exchange for 
letting its senior officers go scot-free. While this practice may sometimes 
be defended in cases of slight infractions of the law, this is not the case 
when serious crimes are committed. In the latter case, this practice 
distorts the incentives to reduce crime and hence destroys the very 
rationale of both corporate criminal liability in general and of its 
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extension to corporate incumbents in particular. The normative 
conclusion of this Article is that plea bargains ought to be taken with a 
large grain of salt for severe corporate criminality and be rejected by the 
sitting judge when appropriate. This is not a slight matter to be expected 
of judges with over-loaded dockets and a chronic deficit of leisure time, 
but it does seem a noble and essential measure to satisfy the onerous 
weight of their distinguished vocation. 
